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Constitutionalism and antiquity transformation*
Patricia Springborg
Centre for British Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
Straumann presents a grand narrative: Roman constitutionalism in
the West from the age of Cicero to the American Founding
Fathers. His project is forensic, mounting a case framed in terms of
a dichotomy between the Greek ethical and political tradition of
Plato and Aristotle which emphasizes civic virtue (Pocock’s classical
republicanism), and the Roman-law based constitutionalism of
Cicero (Skinner’s version). But this is too easy. Cicero was heavily
influenced by Aristotle; and the very survival of Western civilization
depended on translation movements, Greek into Arabic and Arabic
into Latin, under the Abbasid and Cordoba Caliphates, which
preserved the classical Greek texts on which it rests, and
recirculated them back to Europe. This had important implications
for Islamic jurisprudence, which was the progenitor of medieval
European jurisprudence and scholastic dialectic. Justinian’s
recovery of Roman Law and subsequent medieval codifications are
related to the impetus for the Islamic translation movement and
Islamic jurisprudence at one remove. Why are the Eastern Roman
(Byzantine) Empire (which saw a continuation of Hellenic culture),
the Islamic empires (which saw a continuation of Hellenistic
culture), and the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Peoples





1. Constitutionalism and grand narratives
To review Benjamin Straumann’s Crisis and Constitutionalism is a formidable task.1 A
master of the Roman Law tradition in early modern Europe, Straumann presents a
grand narrative: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revo-
lution, with an impressive command of detail. This is, in effect, a study of Roman consti-
tutionalism in the West, from the age of Cicero to the founding fathers of the US. It is
nested in the frameworks of contemporary grand narratives, but not in terms of the
triumph of ancient virtue, of the standard classical republican tradition told by John
Pocock,2 which focuses on Plato, Aristotle and Renaissance revivalists, like Machiavelli.
But rather in terms of Roman law, as elaborated by Cicero, politician, philosopher and
a forensic lawyer, whose works, De Republica (On Commonwealth), De Legibus (On
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Laws), and De Officiis (On Duties), were possibly the most read ancient texts in the West,
from the late Middle Ages, through the Renaissance, to the early modern period. They are
standard items of the classical humanist curriculum, as Quentin Skinner, in so many of his
excellent pieces, has emphasized.3 It is the first premise of contextualism that the basis for
any intellectual or legal tradition lies in the continuity of its educational curricula, as well
as its public and private practices; and it is the continuity of the Roman Law tradition in
the West that Straumann sets out to chart.
Straumann is sensitive to his task and the grand narratives with which he competes,
addressing them specifically, first the classical republican tradition as constructed by
John Pocock, focused on the Aristotelian tradition of civic virtue arising out of the
small city states of Greece, and memorialized in modern political thought by thinkers
like Hannah Arendt, with which he disagrees. And second the classical republican tra-
dition as construed by Quentin Skinner, focussed rather on neo-Roman liberties, and the
political theory of Machiavelli, which he accepts. Straumann’s case is indeed directed at
these two versions of the classical republican tradition. But competing grand narratives
are like the three Christs of Ypsilanti, they cannot all be right.4 Or can they? Grand nar-
ratives as a species of history face the truth test ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’, because to
make exclusive truth claims rules out competing narratives. But the history of political
thought seems to be exempt from this rule. Competing traditions of constitutionalism,
in the tradition of Charles McIlwain,5 or the classical republican tradition, in either
the polis-based version of Pocock, or the Roman-based system of Skinner, are transpar-
ently constructions, and do not face the tests of ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ in the strict
sense – although those who defend these grand narratives in political theory, in their
enthusiasm, often overlook their nature as constructions. More than one narrative
can in fact be more or less right, because they are not claiming to report things on
the ground as they actually were, but rather as they were perceived. And political
theory is nothing if not the art of the perceived. It is that vast arsenal of argumentation
on which politicians and historians draw to make sense of motivations, at the micro-
level, and institutions, at the macro-level. As compared with history-writing in
general, not a lot has been written about the ontology and epistemology of the history
of political thought, hence the tendency to submit political theory to the same criteria
as historiography in general.
Pocock in the methodological reflections of his magisterial six volume commentary on
Gibbon, maintains, in fact, that historiography is the form that political theory originally
took. This is plausible when we consider the histories of the ancients, who were much
more modest in their truth claims than historians after von Ranke, the first to make the
explicit claim ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ (history as it really was). Reinhard Koselleck
(1923–2006), in his important contribution on ‘History’, or ‘Geschichte’ in the Geschich-
tliche Grundbegriffe, or History of Basic Concepts, notes that the German word for history
up until the eighteenth century, was ‘Historia’, borrowing the Greek and Roman term,
which in its ancient use did not fundamentally distinguish between history and stories.6
And indeed, in its early usage, the modern German term for history, ‘Geschichte’, from
‘Geschehen’, ‘what has come to pass’, could only be used in the plural, indicating an open-
ness to competing stories and, perhaps for this reason, ‘Geschichte’, very correctly could
not be the subject of a sentence. These constraints on its German usage suggested a similar
stance to that of the ancients, which Paul Veyne in his Did the Greeks believe in their
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Myths? nicely illustrated.7 It was up to the reader to decide whether when Pausanias, relat-
ing the histories garnered from his trips up and down Italy, noted, ‘people say this’, or
‘people say that’, thought they were true, or intended us to take them as true, his very
form of presentation suggesting a fair degree of scepticism.
Pocock, in the third volume of his Gibbon, gives perhaps the most sophisticated
account we have of historiography as a species of political theory, noting that while
modern history is evaluated in terms of the sources, and how persuasive it is as an expla-
nation of events taking place on the ground (‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen’), ancient history
was a didactic exercise, written by and for the consumption of the political and military
classes, to motivate them by heroic example to live up to the founding values of the Repub-
lic.8 It was not source-based, but drew on the debates of rhetoricians who moralized
history; the resources of the past being thought of not as archival, but rhetorical. To the
extent that these rhetorical debates were pluralistic, the histories reflecting them could
also be pluralistic. In this respect the histories reflected reality, where ‘the republic dis-
solves into a mere cockpit of political (or post-political) competition by military
means’.9 The Roman dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla is a good example. Sulla stood at
the cusp of Republic and Empire, and has always been considered Janus-faced, cruel
and merciless in the defense of the Republic to the point where he was prepared to
march on Rome to save it from its enemies within. He thus prefigured an Empire in
which, as Edward Gibbon already diagnosed, one of its frailties lay in Emperors who
were no longer necessarily created in Rome, but must march on it in order to be legiti-
mized! But in Sulla we have a figure, who in terms of his own reflexivity, and the self-con-
scious shaping of his presentation of the self as ‘felicitas, or favoured by the gods’, gives us
an important account of how he saw his own legitimation.10 The ancient ambivalence
about Sulla is therefore highly symptomatic The twentieth century experience of cata-
strophic absolute power, and search for the understanding of its causes, prompted theo-
reticians like Max Weber, and jurists, political theorists, and activists, like Carl Schmitt,
to go back to the Roman Dictatorship, and particularly Sulla, for answers.11
There are some among us who believe that the differences between ancient histories and
modern historiography, methodology aside, are not so great, and that the triumphal tales
of the grand narrative tradition, including that of the master of the art form, Edward
Gibbon, are similarly designed for the makers of empire and political elites. Gibbon’s
first volume, let us not forget, was published in 1776, the year of American Independence
and of his friend Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. And although we might paraphrase
Mark Twain in declaring rumours of the death of the British Empire to have been
greatly exaggerated, and we have no other evidence that Gibbon, or Adam Smith for
that matter, thought the end of empire was nigh, Gibbon was, nevertheless, firing a
warning shot over the bow. This was a case, in line with Straumann’s analysis, of
writers who became sensitized to constitutionalism by threats posed to the ancien
regime. It was true of Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution (1790) as it was of Mon-
tesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws (1748). And it is a cautionary tale for the present, when popu-
lism, that old bugbear, and right wing fanatics, once again threaten to destabilize the
political order established since the last epochal war, WWII.
It is not surprising perhaps, as commentators have long observed, that the most com-
pelling forms of the narrative are produced in times of constitutional crisis. This goes for
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx and Schmitt. But it also goes for lesser modern
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historians, Ronald Syme, and Charles McIlwain, writing under the threat of National
Socialism. It is noteworthy that Straumann’s own account takes the classic form of this
narrative, the threat of tyranny, and the question of where the guarantees of rule of law
lie. Is it with the original and irrevocable translatio of the power of the people to the
prince? Or do the comitia of the people retain their right to expression of the sovereign
will? Questions being raised again by the constitutional crises engendered by the
Trump Presidency, Brexit, and the wave of populism engulfing Germany and Eastern
Europe. Our current constitutional crises are frighteningly reminiscent of the crises of
Weimar, and the legal responses of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, fathers of modern jur-
isprudence, who debated national emergency powers under Article 48 of theWeimar Con-
stitution, invoking the Roman model of the dictator.
It is widely agreed that it was in Germany out of all European countries, that the
modern reception of Roman Law was the most complete. Straumann, as a German-
Swiss, is in this tradition. When the elaborate confederation of the Holy Roman
Empire, tied together by remnants of Roman constitutional government in towns and
cities, and home to the great Roman Law revivalists in the universities of Bologna and
Padua, founded by the Papacy to train administrators, finally broke down with the con-
quest of Napoleon, attempts at re-confederation drew once again on Roman constitutional
resources. A remarkable group of contemporaneous scholars, jurists, philologists, and his-
toriographers, working together, and sometimes in correspondence, crafted the legal struc-
tures of the German Empire which achieved unification only in 1870, while
revolutionizing their fields by employing source-based evidence. They included Friedrich
Carl von Savigny (1779–1861) the great German jurist and legal scholar who responded to
the call of the Anton F.L. Thibaut, professor of Roman law at Heidelberg, for a unified
German civil code. Savigny, professor of Roman Law at the University of Berlin (and at
the instigation of Wilhelm von Humboldt) from 1810, was a contemporary of Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, writing in a very different tradition. Interestingly, Leopold
von Ranke, professor of history at Berlin from 1825, intervened in the dispute between
the followers of Hegel, defending teleological and narrative based history, against followers
of Savigny, defending the historical study of positive law, on the side of the latter. But this
was hardly surprising, given the stand Savigny had taken against Christian Wolff, author
of Institutiones juris naturae et gentium, in the venerable natural law tradition, at that time
considered outmoded. (It does interest me that Straumann’s focus in his treatment of
Hugo Grotius, in Roman Law in the State of Nature, is very much in the natural law tra-
dition, but between Savigny versus Hegel, I imagine he is on Savigny’s side!).
A later generation of Berlin scholars includes the towering (but diminutive) figure,
Theodor Mommsen, (1817–1903), classicist and archeologist, historian, jurist, journalist,
and, as a member of the Prussian parliament and Bundestag, politician, notable for being a
nationalist who nevertheless was outspokenly opposed to Anti-Semitism, believing that
the German Reich should incorporate all minorities, by assimilation. Mommsen, a pio-
neering archeologist and epigrapher, was a master of new techniques for the systematic
study of Roman history based on material artifacts, his collection of Roman inscriptions
contributed to the Berlin Academy, the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, being perhaps
his most enduring legacy. His work on Roman law, the Roman Constitutional Law
(1871–1888) and Roman Criminal Law (1899), along with his editions of Justinian’s
Digest (1866–1870), Jordanes’ Origin and Deeds of the Goth (1882) and the posthumous
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Codex Theodosianus (1905), had a lasting impact on the German civil code. But it was
Mommsen’s three volume History of Rome (1854, 1855, and 1856) that had the greatest
impact on German historiography, while earning him the Nobel Prize in 1902 as ‘the
greatest living master of the art of historical writing’. Mommsen, although a master phi-
lologist and source-historian, is nevertheless in the ancient tradition of moralistic histor-
ians, like Gibbon himself, who saw the resources of the past not as archival, but rhetorical.
Egon Friedell (1978–1938), Jewish polymath, cultural historian and cabaretist, declared of
Mommsen’s History of Rome, that in his hands ‘Crassus becomes a speculator in the
manner of Louis Philippe, the brothers Gracchus are Socialist leaders, and the Gauls are
Indians, etc.’12
As philologists, historiographers, and jurists, these scholars also began the modern reas-
sessment of the transition from Roman Republic to Empire, which was later taken up by
the New Zealanders, Ronald Syme (1903–1989), at Oxford, and Ernst Badian (1925–2011,
a student both of L.G. Pocock, John Pocock’s father, and Ronald Syme), at Harvard. We
see, in this later generation of scholars, how modern historiography and jurisprudence
became ‘scientific’ with the specialization of disciplines like Classics, which deals with a
more or less closed universe of texts (and inscriptions). This closure encouraged Classi-
cists, and particularly German Classicists, to be very innovative in using what quantitative
data they had to hand, for instance, FriedrichMünzer’s (1868–1942) andMatthias Gelzer’s
(1886–1974) use of prosopography to study the Roman nobility.13 The Roman Fasti (the
lists of consular officials), due to the strict order of names (nomen, cognomen), give us
information about family, clan and tribe, that enabled classicists to create social profiles
for whole classes of actors for whom they had no individual data. Prosopography in the
twentieth century allowed classicists like Ronald Syme (The Roman Revolution, 1939)
and Ernst Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 1958), to show how Roman history was governed
not so much by formal rules (i.e. the laws or the constitution) as by informal ones: the
laws of power politics and the machinations of patron-client systems. Syme’s position,
incidentally, is one that Straumann rejects, arguing for a continuity of constitutionalism
in the law-based critique of Cicero, even in the bad times during the collapse of the
Republic.
It is true that Gelzer, Münzer and Syme’s use of prosopography, brilliantly imitated by
Sir Lewis Namier in The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (1929), was an
elaborate form of source-based research in the tradition of von Ranke, that imitated the
methodologies of the modern social sciences, as practiced by Max Weber and his succes-
sors; but at the risk of over-quantification. History as narrative in the tradition of Hegel
has its own occupational hazards however: the risks of teleological reasoning, as von
Ranke pointed out, and, typically, of triumphalism. This is apparent for instance in McIl-
wain’s Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (1947). Written, like Syme’s Roman Revo-
lution, in the shadow of National Socialism, McIlwain emphasizes the long European
tradition of rule of law and its transportation to the New World in the form of American
constitutionalism. Straumann is in the tradition of McIlwain, as McIlwain, in turn, was in
the tradition of Benjamin Constant, writing under the threat of a Jacobin revival of antique
models. Constant distinguished the ancients from the moderns in terms of the civic liberty
of the Greeks and Romans, and the private liberties of modern Europeans based on the
primacy of the right to property, emphasized by Cicero, and the rise of commerce, an his-
torical evolution that it would, in Constant’s view, be foolhardy to try to reverse.
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Straumann praises Constant (pp. 3–5), while arguing against ‘the overly expansive term
[classical republicanism] under which… the realities of the Greek city-states of Athens,
Sparta, and the lesser Greek poleis as well as of Rome’, along with their political
thought, are subsumed (p. 3).
2. Straumann the advocate
If we are closing the gap between historiography and the history of political thought, what
might the implications be for the latter? People have multiple political strategies and much
going on in their heads. Is this again the case of history being written by the winners? Or,
as Skinner maintains of the Roman idea of liberty, is it sometimes also that of the losers?
And what, if anything, has this to do with Straumann’s grand narrative, which is, as I have
already noted, a work in political theory, and therefore not bound by the same constraints?
(Perhaps we should distinguish between political theory and the history of political
thought, which might be bound by the same constraints as history in general). The
message I expect us to take from this, is that constructions are constructions, whether
they come with the claim ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ or not. The fact that some of these
grand narratives have fired up highly durable confederations, or empires, while others
have been consigned ignominiously to the dustbins of history, is certainly not a substitute
for validation. Perhaps history, whether the history of political thought, or facts on the
ground, has to be written in this magisterial voice, or no one would take any notice
(and in the age of Trump, less and less do!) Perhaps this belongs to the rhetoric of
history-writing, about which a great deal less has been written than about the rhetoric
of political theorists. Writers of grand narratives are still writing for makers of empire
and civil servants, lest we forget! Witness Straumann’s title!
But we are still not sure what this author is claiming when he claims to be giving a
history of: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution.
Just because constitutionalism appeals to a higher order, the rule of law, among a set of
constructions it seems also to be of a different order, and must face the test of praxis, con-
stitutional and case law, so cannot be constructed at will! Constitutional and case law are,
however, largely missing in Straumann’s account. Daniel Lee makes the case for Roman
Law as an idiom, of a similar order to the competing legal idioms Pocock pointed to
over fifty years ago in his Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law,14 in this case a
broad church idiom, which is an almost inexhaustible resource.15 But this is not really
Straumann’s stance. To my mind what Straumann is doing is forensic. As a legal historian
he is constructing a case, and so he marshals only the evidence which supports it. Strau-
mann’s declamatory tone announces his stance as defendant. So, for instance, his opening
statement: ‘Rome, not Athens, has had the deeper impact onWestern political history both
in the province of the history of events and institutions and in the realm of political and
legal ideas’; followed by the elaboration: ‘This extraordinary prominence of Rome in pol-
itical and legal thought remained until at least the rehabilitation of democracy, including
Athenian democracy, in the nineteenth century’.16 As a truth claim this is impossibly
broad, and I am daring to set out here to qualify it. But as an opening gambit for the
defence it is impressive, allowing him to skip over centuries, possibly millennia, and
over great swathes of territory belonging to the late Roman Empire and its cultures.
Quite properly for a defence lawyer, he incorporates where possible evidence from the
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other side, but not as an acknowledgment of alternative narratives, but rather of the vera-
city of his own defence. Of course, as a lawyer mounting a case, he has to acknowledge that
it is contestable, and that he might not win! But this acknowledgment is a concession that
does not belong to forensic rhetoric, and for this reason, perhaps, Straumann argues such a
strong line, that it appears to admit no alternatives. Quentin Skinner has already empha-
sized the power of forensic rhetoric in Shakespeare, as a demonstration of the humanist
tradition.17 But insufficient attention has been paid to the forensic rhetoric of historians
and historiographers of political thought. I am taking Benjamin Straumann’s case to try
to make a beginning. So, in the role of cross-examiner, I put to him the following
questions:
(1) Is this just another history of Western triumphalism, however well executed, in which
Straumann is simply replacing one favoured edifice (Greek democracy) with another
(Roman Constitutionalism)?
(2) Is there real evidence for the reflexivity and self-consciousness of Roman constitution-
alism that he claims? In the case of Cicero, for example, or Sallust?
(3) Why are the Eastern Roman Empire, which saw a continuation of Hellenic culture,
and the Islamic empires, which saw a continuation of Hellenistic (Graeco-Roman)
culture, along with the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Peoples, which
revived Roman Law, missing from this account?
(4) What does the shift with Justinian (which he does not treat) represent? Does Justinian’s
refusal to allow further interpretation of Roman Law, once the codifiers had completed
their task, and his closure of the Greek Academy in 529AD, to forestall debate, not
suggest a high degree of reflexivity and awareness of the fragility of his construction?
(5) What room is there for alternative grand narratives? Straumann’s dichotomy between
the Greek ethical and political tradition of Plato and Aristotle, which emphasizes civic
virtue, and the Roman-law based constitutionalism of Cicero, is too easy. The two
come together in a complex way. The very survival of Western civilization depended
on translation movements, Greek into Arabic and Arabic into Latin, under the
Abbasid and Cordoba Caliphates, which preserved the texts on which it rests, and
recirculated them back to Europe. This had important implications for Islamic juris-
prudence which was the progenitor of medieval European jurisprudence and scholas-
tic dialectic. Justinian’s recovery of Roman Law is related to the impetus for the
Islamic translation movement at one remove.
Not all of these questions can be addressed here, so I omit discussion of question 2).
Questions 3), and 5) concern Straumann’s failure to consider the Eastern Roman (Byzan-
tine) Empire, or its successor states in the Islamic Empires as belonging to the history of
the Roman Empire that he charts. In the case of the Byzantine Empire, as I discuss below,
he follows Gibbon, whose bleak assessment of its history led him to believe that it was
hardly worthy of his attention. In the case of the Islamic Empires, which could fairly be
held best to represent the continuity of ancient Greek thought in that long period that
he largely omits, the Holy Roman Empire, this has important implications for his thesis
that ‘Rome, not Athens, has had the deeper impact on Western political history both in
the province of the history of events and institutions and in the realm of political and
legal ideas’. Although, when it comes to my critique, Straumann may consider himself
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unfairly done by in the case of the Islamic Empires, a little historical investigation shows
that indeed the impact of Athens on the West is prior to that of the Cicero’s Rome in every
sense. As I wrote in an essay published over 30 years ago:
the long tradition of mythologizing the polis, otherwise known as ‘the classical republican tra-
dition’, has two great achievements to its credit. The first is to claim for the great landed mon-
archies of Europe the heritage of the city-republics of classical Greece as their very own. The
second is the distancing of Western regimes from those of the East, by ‘Orientalizing’ them
and stereotyping them as monarchical or ‘despotic’ and ‘other’.18
I go on to argue: ‘This latter achievement is all the greater for the fact that recent scholar-
ship in Assyriology, and even some classical scholars, now acknowledge that polis society
was found in Mesopotamia long before Greece, creating traditions from which the classical
polis may well have derived.’ ‘The net result of “classical republicanism”’, I conclude ‘is
thus an extraordinary historical inversion, which renders monarchical regimes “essen-
tially” democratic and Eastern regimes “essentially” despotic’.
It is a judgment I still stand by. Not only are the Mesopotamian law codes, of which the
Hammurabi Code is the most famous, ancestors of the Roman tradition of constitution-
alism that Straumann narrates, numerous scholars commenting on the similarity between
them and Roman Law as we know it. But the continuity of Roman law depended very
much upon the law schools of the Eastern Roman Empire, and in particular the Beirut
school of law, where Ulpian (Gnaeus Domitius Annius Ulpianus, c. AD 170–223), from
a Phoenician Tyre-based family, and one of the five jurists upon whom decisions were
to be based according to the Law of Citations of Valentinian III, was probably a professor.
Already under the Principate and the late Republic legal practices differed considerably
between the Western and Eastern Roman provinces. Early Roman lawyers had been
‘state priests’ recruited from the patrician class. But the shift from ‘an aristocratic Republic
to an absolute military monarchy’, had important consequences for legal practices.19 ‘Pon-
tifical jurisprudence, so long a secret science, was published to the world about the year
254 B.C. by Tiberius Coruncanius, the earliest plebian pontiff, who first avowed himself
a public jurisconsult’.20 From the moment that law shifted from the priestly into the
public domain, ‘commentary on the Twelve Tables and the pontifical proceedings for
actions and juristic acts’ was the basic form it took; and from very early the profession
was divided between rival schools of commentators, the Sabinians and Proculians,
which sprang up under Augustus and lasted as long as Emperor Marcus Aurelius
(Sherman, 501). Commentators already credit the Eastern influence of the scientific
methods of Stoic philosophy in ‘shaping law into a rational artistic form’. Cato the
younger (d. 152 BC) was the first to attempt to systematize the heterogeneous elements
of the law, a task fully accomplished only in 100 BC by Scaevola the younger, whose sys-
temic arrangement and classification of positive law according to subject matter (wills,
legacies, guardianship, contracts such as sale, etc.) became the foundation for future
jurists (Sherman, 500). The institutional development of Roman Law, far from being
written constitutional law of the modern type, early exhibited the heterogeneous combi-
nation of Institutes (lnstitutiones) of instructors and Digests of commentators plus the
judgments of practitioners that were to characterize it into the medieval period.21
At the same time legal practices in the Western and Eastern Empires became differen-
tiated. In the second century BC already, Rome came to depend for advocates on forensic
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orators, a new class of privately paid legal practitioners who met the demand for more
advocates driven by increasing activity in the comitia: ‘known at first as oratores and
later as advocati, and, during the Imperial period, as causidici, togati or patroni’
(Chroust, p. 564), these homines novi came from all strata of Roman and Italian
society, and were trained in rhetoric but often unscrupulous and notoriously ignorant
of the law. Among them were nevertheless men of great eminence like Seneca, Tacitus,
and Pliny the younger. With the irrevocable break between the Western and Eastern
empires in AD 395, Chroust argues (p. 524), ‘the West no longer kept up with the
many and significant developments which in the course of the fifth and sixth centuries
A.D. made the East-Roman legal profession truly progressive’. By the fourth century
AD aspiring advocates in the East ‘no longer attended schools of general rhetoric’, as
they did in the West, but rather enrolled for up to five years in ‘regular law schools’ to
satisfy the requirement of the East-Roman Emperor Leo I (AD 457–74), whose decree
of 460 required advocates to be certified by examination (Chroust, p. 572). From the
fourth century on we see increasing imperial control on the part of the Eastern emperors,
due to ‘serious overcrowding of the legal profession, especially in the capital, Constantino-
ple’, to regulate the numbers admitted to law school, and advocates admitted to plead
before the praetorian courts in Alexandria, Constantinople (by Leo I, 457–74 AD), the pre-
fectures of Illyria (by Emperor Zeno, 474–91) and Syria (by Emperor Anastasius, 491–518)
(Chroust, 577–8).
The ‘state law school’ was famously introduced by Diocletian (284–305AD) and
extended first to the law schools of Rome and Berytus (Beirut), already operating, and
only later to the law schools of Constantinople, Alexandria and Caesarea (Sherman,
503). The edict of Theodosius the younger, who established a university at Constantinople
in 425 AD, with 3 professors of rhetoric, 5 sophists and 10 grammarians, as well as 2 pro-
fessorships in law, stipulates the comportment expected of professors and students alike
(Sherman, 504). And many edicts and official records attest to the organization of the pro-
fession and its ‘schools’ and ‘colleges’. ‘Lawyers admitted to the same court formed a sort
of “bar association” called schola (school) and, hence, were referred to as scholastici’,
Chroust notes (578).
These ‘schools’ or ‘colleges of advocates’ (collegium togatorum), supervised, among other
things, the professional conduct of their members… presided over by a primas, a sort of ‘pre-
sident of the local bar association,’who also held the paid office of an advocatus fisci, or ‘attor-
ney of the crown’ … Each schola had certain corporate rights, and every member enjoyed a
number of privileges and exemptions from certain public duties which were secured by law.
(Chroust, p. 578–9)
The Law School of Beirut, ‘of which Ulpian was probably a professor’ (Sherman, 503),
deserves special mention: ‘called by Libanius “the mother of all laws,” by Nonnus “the
City of Laws,” and by Emperor Justinian “the midwife of all laws”’, it was ‘destined to
become the most famous law school in the Roman world’ (Chroust, 600, citing Collinet,
51–64). Dorotheus and Anatolius, both professors of the Beirut law school, were
especially praised by Justinian for their wisdom and summoned by him to assist his min-
ister Tribonian in compiling his Codex, the Empire’s body of civil laws issued between
AD 529 and 534. The prologue to Justinian’s completed Omnem constitution of 533
(Digest, 35) read:
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These three works which we have composed we desire should be put in their hands in royal
cities as well as in the most fair city of Berytus, which may well be styled the nursing mother
of law, as indeed previous Emperors have commanded, but in no other places which did not
enjoy the same privilege in old times, as we have heard that even in the brilliant city of Alex-
andria, and in Caesarea and others, there have been ignorant men who, instead of doing their
duty, conveyed spurious lessons to their pupils, and such as these we desire to make desist
from that attempt by laying down the above limits, so that, if they should hereafter be
guilty of such conduct and carry on their duties outside the royal cities and the metropolis
Berytus, they may be punished by a fine of ten pounds of gold and be expelled from the
city in which instead of teaching the law they transgress the law.
Just as a number of ancient historians had been law students in Rome – Seneca, Tacitus,
and Pliny the younger among them – so the Beirut School also had famous historians and
administrators as alumni. Eusebius of Caesarea, bishop of Caesarea Maritima about 314
AD, ecclesiastical historian and counselor to Constantine the Great, records in his On
the Life of Pamphilus that Pamphilus of Caesarea was born into a rich family in Beirut
in the latter half of the third century and attended its law school. Pamphilus, who is cele-
brated as a martyr by both the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches, later
became the presbyter of Caesarea Maritima and the founder of its extensive Christian
library. Eunapius wrote of Anatolius, a high-ranking Roman official trained at the law
school in Beirut, who occupied the offices of consul of Syria, vicarius of the Diocese of
Asia, proconsul of Constantinople, urban prefect of Constantinople in 354, and Praetorian
prefect of Illyricum until his death in 360, that: ‘He reached the summit of the science of
law. Nothing about this is surprising because Beirut, his homeland, is the mother and
nurse of these studies’.22 Similarly, Libanius’ correspondence with Gaianus of Tyre dis-
cusses the latter’s achievements after his graduation from the law school of Beirut; to
become the consular governor of Phoenicia in 362. Gazan lawyer and church historian
Sozomen, also a law student at Beirut, wrote in hisHistoria Ecclesiastica about Triphyllius,
a convert to Christendom who became the bishop of Nicosia, that Triphyllius received
legal training in Beirut and was criticized by his teacher Saint Spyridon for his atticism
and for using legal vocabulary instead of that of the Bible.
It is noteworthy that Edward Gibbon although scorning ‘Byzantium’, nevertheless
treated its ecclesiastical historians with respect, and seems to have intuited that their
legal training, especially in the case of Eusebius, the greatest of them, made them too pol-
itically involved to be good historians, declaring: ‘The gravest of the ecclesiastical histor-
ians, Eusebius himself, indirectly confesses, that he has related whatever might redound to
the glory, and that he has suppressed all that could tend to the disgrace, of religion’;23
Gibbon goes on to claim:
Such an acknowledgment will naturally excite a suspicion that a writer who has so openly
violated one of the fundamental laws of history has not paid a very strict regard to the obser-
vance of the other; and the suspicion will derive additional credit from the character of Euse-
bius, which was less tinctured with credulity, and more practised in the arts of courts, than
that of almost any of his contemporaries.
For the history of the continuity of Roman law in the Eastern Empire, Gibbon’s disparage-
ment once again cast a long shadow. And yet the hiatus was in the West. The influence of
Justinian’s Codex on Western law, including that of the Americas, dates only from 1070,
when the one surviving complete copy of the Digest in Italy was rediscovered, beginning
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properly in 1088, when Irnerius, jurist and professor at the newly founded University of
Bologna, was the first to teach it.24 Justinian’s refusal to allow further interpretation of
Roman Law in the Eastern Empire, once the codifiers had completed their task, and his
closure of the Greek Academy in 529 AD to forestall debate, which suggest a high
degree of reflexivity and awareness of the fragility of his construction, certainly contribu-
ted. But his ban on commentators did not last into the Holy Roman Empire where his
Codex was precisely taught by means of glosses or explanatory notes, written as marginalia
or between the lines, hence the term ‘glossators’. In this form the medieval revival of
Roman law spread to the universities and law courts of Europe, first France, the Nether-
lands, and finally Germany, where the enactment of the German Civil Code in 1900 put an
end to the application of forms of law derived from the Justinian codes inWestern Europe.
But in the Eastern Roman Empire, during the hiatus of half a millennium in Western
Europe, the influence of the Corpus Juris Civilis was continuous, remaining the basis of
Byzantine law until the publication of the Ecloga legum, an abridged version, in 741 by
Emperor Leo III and his son and co-regent Constantine V. Written in Greek, because
Latin had fallen into disuse, it continued in use in the Balkans and Asia Minor for centu-
ries, with surviving translations in Slavic, Armenian and Arabic.25 Legal compilations
invalidating parts of the Ecloga and restoring Justinian original laws, were introduced
by the nineth century Emperor Basil I,26 whose Prochiron served as the basis for the
legal writings of the twelfth-century first archbishop of Serbia, Saint Sava; a legal compi-
lation intended for the Serbian church but finally adopted as the basic constitution for the
Bulgarian and Russian orthodox churches.27 Around 900, Emperor Leo VI commissioned
the Basilica, a Greek rewriting of Justinian’s laws that served as the ancestor of modern
Greece’s law until the enactment of the Code of 1940.28
3. Translation and antiquity transformation
Developments in legal practice in the Eastern Roman Empire show remarkable continuity
with the Holy Roman Empire, more commonly known as the Middle Ages, and largely
shadowy in Straumann’s account. But just as important for my interrogation of Strau-
mann are the Greek into Arabic and Arabic into Latin translation movements and their
legacy in Islamic jurisprudence, to which we owe the impetus to recover the constitutional
legacy of Justinian, and the institutions and methodologies by which it was incorporated
into theWestern legal tradition. The material on the Eastern Roman Empire has long been
available. But even in the 1980s when I wrote my essays on the legacy of the ancient Greek
polis in the Islamic states, most of the material now available for understanding the impact
of the translation movements under the Arab Caliphates on Islamic jurisprudence, and
further, on Western medieval institutions and practices, was as yet unpublished.
If Byzantium is a gaping black hole in histories of constitutionalism, even as sophisti-
cated as Straumann’s, and the Holy Roman Empire is not even listed in his index, Islamic
jurisprudence is entirely missing. How could a history of Roman constitutionalism that
purports to run from Cicero and the late Roman Republic to the constitutionalism of
the French Republic and the United States of America simply ignore such large swathes
of its history? From the seventh to the eleventh centuries AD the Eastern Mediterranean
was the theatre of constant wars between the Byzantines and Arabs, fighting for control of
the Eastern Roman Empire. And during this period, the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates
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accomplished an antiquity transformation that goes unmentioned in Straumann’s
account, even though the continuity of Western civilization depends on it. Straumann
treats the ancient Greek tradition of Platonic and Aristotelian ethics and politics as separ-
ate from the Roman civil law tradition of Cicero, even though he was profoundly
influenced by Aristotle, and a citizen of Rome which more or less turned the philosophy
of ethics and politics over to the Greeks. The resurrection of Greek philosophy, transmo-
grified by Scholasticism in the West, where the Greek language had slowly died, was first
effected not by a Quattrocento Renaissance centred in Florence, Venice and Rome, but by
an Islamic Enlightenment from the eighth to the twelfth centuries centred in Baghdad, and
later Cordoba and Toledo, which recovered and preserved thousands of Greek philosophi-
cal, mathematical, astronomical, astrological and scientific texts which would otherwise
have been lost. Although legal texts were not part of this cache, Aristotle’s Organon, his
logical works comprising: the Categories, On Interpretation, the Prior Analytics, the Pos-
terior Analytics, Topics, On Sophistical Refutations, to which the Rhetoric was also
related, were texts essential to the development of Islamic jurisprudence which, in turn,
played an important role in the development of medieval scholastic dialectic; was very
likely a motivation for the medieval recovery of Roman Law; and some have argued, a
model for the English Inns of Court.
We have Gibbon to thank for the fact that to this day we refer to the Eastern Roman
Empire as Byzantine, the name in itself apparent grounds for its exclusion from main-
stream history! Gibbon, whose Greek was not as good as his Latin, and who was not a phi-
lologist or an archives-based historian but the producer of grand narratives, harboured
personal contempt for the Byzantine Empire:
Byzantine history was to him ‘a tedious and uniform tale of weakness and misery. On the
throne, in the camp, in the schools, we search, perhaps with fruitless diligence, the names
and characters that deserve to be rescued from oblivion’,
and he therefore felt vindicated, in chapter 48, ‘historically speaking, the weakest section of
the whole work… in rac[ing] through five centuries of Byzantine history’.29 (It is note-
worthy that Pocock’s huge commentary on Gibbon ends with the fall of the Western
Empire, and does not treat the Eastern or Ottoman Empires, either, on the grounds
that Gibbon’s history of the Eastern Empire was a much less coherent project than his
history of the West, requiring different languages and the examination of different
archives and sources).
By contrast, Gibbon’s treatment of Islam is brief but relatively sympathetic. A modern
scholar of Islam notes that
Gibbon long ago insisted that there had been more than one road out of Antiquity, leading
not just to the formation of Latin Christendom – the Papacy, German Empire and Italian
Renaissance – but also to Greek Christendom and the rise of Islam;
and that ‘by examining the origins and expansion of Islam in the context of the decline
and fall of the Roman Empire, Gibbon raised the question whether Christendom – Latin,
Greek and Oriental – can be regarded as the sole legatee of Antiquity’.30 ‘Few individual
historians before or since Gibbon have felt confident to tell the story of both Romes (Old
and New), the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, and the Seljuks, Mongols and Otto-
mans’, he concedes, ‘[y]et only by addressing all these polities, and the peoples who
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constituted them, is it possible to write the history of Eurasia so as to do justice to Asian
as well as European perspectives’. Fowden gives as reasons for Gibbon’s openness to the
Islamic empires as ‘legatee of Antiquity’, the fact that: ‘Not only Voltaire but also the
Universal History (London, 1736–66) encouraged Gibbon to look beyond Europe and
its Christian narrative, while attitudes to Islam had softened in the decades around
1700′, reporting a comment from Philip, second Earl of Hardwicke, to Gibbon, 20
Sept. 1781:
As I have perused your History of the Decline, &c. with the greatest pleasure and instruction,
I cannot help wishing that… you would gratify your numerous readers and admirers, by
continuing it, at least till the irruption of the Arabs after Mahomet. From that period the
History of the East is not very interesting, and often disgusting.
Fowden notes however that ‘this aspect of Decline and Fall remains unappreciated,
especially in John Pocock’s monumental Barbarism and Religion’.31
The extraordinarily lopsided history of Decline and Fall, for which Gibbon himself is
responsible, produces an entirely misleading account, if not indeed a fabrication.
Decline and Fall, might be true of the West, but it was not true of the East, which saw
an extraordinary flourishing of antique culture. While Hellenic culture continued in the
Eastern Roman Empire, now known as Byzantium – all facility in Greek having died
out in the West by AD 1000 – the Islamic world saw the perpetuation of Hellenistic
(i.e. Graeco-Roman culture), by Byzantines, Persians, Syriac Christians, Nestorian Chris-
tians, Greek Orthodox Christians, Christian Copts, Moslem Arabs and Jews. That such a
great tranche of cultures on the perimeters of the Mediterranean, and many of them
Semites, could be banished from the history of the later Roman Empire and its successor
empires, is nothing short of alarming! Moreover, it is precisely to these peoples and their
scholars that we owe the preservation and translation of the great texts of Greek philos-
ophy, mathematics, science, astrology, on which the triumph of western civilization is
based. Without them we would have no Aristotle, no Plato, no Euclid, no Ptolemy and
no Galen! The state of eighteenth century scholarship was such that Gibbon would not
be aware of the scale of the antiquity transformation, as I term it, brought about by the
Greek into Arabic, Arabic into Latin translation movements under the Umayyad,
Abbasid and Cordoba Caliphates. (What were the holders of the chairs of Arabic,
founded at Oxford and Cambridge in the seventeenth century, doing all these years!)
But modern historians do not have the same excuse.
Nor was Gibbon probably in a position to assess Islamic sedentary culture, so bril-
liantly analysed by the great fourteenth century Maliki judge, Ibn Khaldun (born 1332
in Tunis, died 1406 in Cairo), whose Muqaddimah, or Prolegomena, influenced seven-
teenth-century Ottoman historians like Kâtip Çelebi, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and
Mustafa Naima in their analysis of the growth and decline of the Ottoman Empire,
but was generally unknown in Europe until the nineteenth-century.32 The first European
biography of Ibn Khaldun was as early as Barthelemy d’Herbelot’s Bibliotheque orientale
(1697), brief and unreliable, and Pocock, in the first of two essays on Ibn Khaldun in
press with this journal, ‘The Desert and the City: reading the history of civilization in
lbn Khaldun after Edward Gibbon’, and ‘Rational Enthusiasm and Angelicality: the
concept of prophecy in Gibbon and Ibn Khaldun’, notes that d’Herbelot’s Bibliotheque
‘guided Gibbon’s “oriental” learning’.33 The Muqaddimah became widely known only
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in the twentieth century, with the remarkable pioneering Arabic scholars of the Univer-
sity of Berlin, and especially Franz Rosenthal, who produced the most widely used trans-
lation of the Muqqadamah.34 The story Ibn Khaldun tells of the assimilation of
conquering Islamic tribes to the sophisticated cultures of the Fertile Crescent and East
Mediterranean littoral cities, compares starkly with the devastation and barbarization
of the Western Empire, such that even the great Charlemagne is believed to have
been illiterate, his office work handled by Alcuin of York (c. 735–804 AD), who at Char-
lemagne’s invitation, became a leading scholar and teacher at the Carolingian court in
the 780s and ‘90s. Byzantium had become increasingly closed, after the Emperor Justi-
nian shut down the Athenian Academy in 529AD, upon which philosophers who had
taught there left for Persia. We have evidence that some Greek into Arabic translation
took place under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 AD) centred in Damascus already.
But the Umayyad ruled over a Greek-speaking population, they used Byzantine admin-
istrators, including descendants of the Byzantine foederati, and they had, by and large. no
need of translations because they could read the Greek texts to which they had access.
However, Byzantine exclusionary practices and Orthodox Christian high culture were
hostile to Hellenic culture, and Dmitri Gutas, Rosenthal’s student at Yale, whose
command of Greek, Arabic, Syriac, Pahlavi, Persian, and Turkish, like that of his
teacher, uniquely qualifies him for the philological and archival work that study of the
Greek into Arabic translation movement demands, notes the relative failure of the trans-
lation efforts of Boethius and Sergius of Damascus.35
With the foundation of Baghdad by the Abbasid Caliphate in AD 762, we have a very
different story. Located in the heart of Mesopotamia and a Persian (Pahlavi – speaking)
population, it set in train a sequence of events that constituted antiquity transformation
on a grand scale. A translation machine was set up as a well-calculated legitimation strat-
egy to recover the ancient Persian wisdom so revered by a formerly Sassanian popu-
lation, and largely destroyed by Alexander the Great with the conquest of Persia and
the burning of the royal library at Persepolis. A remarkable cross section of society,
including Syriac-speakers, Nestorian Christians, orthodox Christians, and Jewish scho-
lars, participated, in this translation movement, and over two centuries thousands of
scientific, philosophical and medical texts, notably by Aristotle, Ptolemy, Galen, and
Euclid and others were translated, sometimes many times over, so that the Leipzig
Galen of 1821–33 comprised some 122 treatises in 20 volumes, while the Berlin
Reimer Aristotle Commentaries (1882–1909) ran to many volumes. This extraordinary
set of contingencies involving conquest and destruction, first by Persia of Greece, and
then Greece of Persia, produced translation machines, Greek into Arabic, under the
Abbasid Caliphate, and later Arabic into Latin in Spain and Sicily, under the Caliphate
in Cordoba. To them, along with centuries of Arabic commentary that fed the four
schools of Islamic jurisprudence, Hanifi, Maliki, Shaf’i and Hanabali, we largely owe
the rise of Arabic science in the East and the survival of Greek philosophy and
science in the West.
To understand how this extraordinary sequence of events, and one of the only known
examples of the translatio studii, so revered by the Renaissance, took place we need to
review its history in a little more detail. The foundation of Baghdad by the Abbasids in
AD 762 shifted the Caliphate from a Greek-speaking population under the Umayyad Cali-
phate (661 to 750 AD) in Damascus to a predominantly Persian speaking population in
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the heart of Mesopotamia, belonging previously to the Sasanian Empire. The Persian
population of the Abbasid Caliphate centred in Baghdad was now more diverse than
the largely Greek population under the Umayyyads, comprising Christian and Jewish min-
orities as well as Muslims, and the Abbasid revolution had succeeded largely due to coop-
tation of the Sasanian Persian elite. Perceived as more Persian than Arab, the Abbasid
Caliphate then had to deal with minorities that were hostile to this shift, which involved
dynastic complications and score-settling. Greek learning had already been thoroughly
assimilated by Syriac speakers, Syriac traditions differed from those of the Chalcedonian,
Monophysite and Nestorian communities, also preserving Greek culture and pre-Islamic
Hellenic traditions. It was these communities that provided an immediate source of Greek
translators (Gutas, 14–16). Under the Abbasids, unlike its predecessor Caliphate, the
Umayyads, anti-Hellenic Orthodox Christianity played very little role. Moreover, Indian
scientific materials, especially astronomy, and the imperial ideology of the Zoroastrians
had already been transmitted through Pahlavi, the Middle Persian of the Sasanians, the
Zoroastrians showing an interest in Aristotle’s physics, for instance (Gutas, 25–26). So
Persian into Arabic under the Abbasids, followed the same pattern as Greek into
Arabic under the Umayyad, a case of practicalities in the aftermath of conquest, but on
a much larger scale.
Gutas is emphatic that the Abbasid translation movement was politically driven, motiv-
ated by appeasement of the supporters of the Abbasid revolution, particularly the Persian
faction, heirs to imperial culture since the Babylonians and through the Sasanian Empire
(Gutas, 28–9). Al Mansur, the second Abbasid Caliph and founder of the translation
movement, was focused on Sasanian culture, political astrology and Zoroastrian imperial
culture, including accounts of the Persian transmission of knowledge from earliest times
(Gutas, 35). The prehistory of his project was Alexander the Great’s destruction of Zoroas-
trian learning and its recovery, having passed into Egyptian hands from Alexander’s Greek
translations and those of the Copts (Gutas, 36–40). Gutas talks about the wide dispersal of
texts, to India, Byzantium, and even China, and the self-consciousness of Syriac (Aramaic)
speakers as being descendants of the Babylonians (Gutas, 41–3). As befitting the propa-
ganda, all Greek texts were seen as having been pillaged from the Persians, and this per-
ception drove the culture of translation (Gutas, 44–5). Astrology was particularly
important in legitimizing the Abbasid Caliphate, as a political ideology claiming to be
the storehouse of the ancient wisdom of the Babylonians and Persians. There was also
another angle to it. Although the Abbasid revolution had been prepared among a
mainly Persian population, it had met the resistance of landowners and national-revivalist
Zoroastrians. Translation was therefore also the answer to preserving a dying language,
Pahlavi, as well as being a recruitment tool to bring minorities on board (Gutas, 46).
The Abbasid capital of Hurasan, Marw, an ancient seat of learning, had been the centre
of revivalist Zoroastrianism, and was carefully chosen as the headquarters of the trans-
lation movement and its ‘House of Wisdom’, or Royal library, in line with al-Mansur’s
policy decision to coopt Zoroastrianism and transfer it to Baghdad (Gutas, 50). Until
the fall of the Abbasid regime after the sack of the Mongols, Marw was famous as a
centre for scholarship and for its libraries. Significantly, the earliest Arabic translations
were not from Greek, but from Pahlavi and they were of predominantly astrological
texts, some dating from Mesopotamian civilization.
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4. Antiquity transformation and Islamic jurisprudence
The Greek into Arabic translation movement under the Abbasids lasted two centuries,
from the eighth century to the tenth centuries AD. It was followed by the period of the
great Islamic commentators from the tenth to the twelfth centuries AD: Al-Kindi,
c. 801–873 from the Baghdad House of Wisdom, a major translator of Aristotle to
Arabic; Al-Farabi, c. 872–950, a peripatetic Aristotelian and Neoplatonist, who moved
between Baghdad, Aleppo and Cairo; Avicenna (Ibn Sina) 981–1037, the Persia Aristote-
lian, born in Bukhara, died in Hamadān; Avempace (Ibn Bājjah) 1095–1138, the Andalu-
sian polymath, born in Zaragoza and died in Fez; and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) 1126–1198,
the Aristotelian from Cordoba, who died in Marrakech. It is remarkable, as modern scho-
lars concur, that these commentators took up the central epistemological, ontological and
scientific questions of the Greek philosophers of antiquity, and succeeded in treating them
in a thoroughly Hellenic way. It is undoubtedly due to the plethora of philosophy schools
scattered around the Levant, and the belief of the commentators as well as of the transla-
tors, that Greek philosophy was indeed the ancient Mesopotamian and Persian wisdom,
and not a monopoly of the Greeks. It was indeed the case that the Islamic state was the
continuation of the Hellenistic state, and many of the philosophers who influenced
them were Hellenistic philosophers and Alexandrian based – Plotinus of course, and
the Neoplatonists, as well as Stoics, Sceptics and Epicureans.
There was not a field of philosophy or science that the Arab translators and commen-
tators did not touch. It is true of questions debated between Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus
on ‘the one and the many’ for instance, and the questions of the Epicureans on ‘atoms and
the void’; even ‘squaring the circle’, which has a very Hobbesian ring to it. From all
accounts Aquinas knew Aristotle only through Averroes, but because Averroes so faith-
fully represented Aristotle, and across his whole corpus, Aquinas did not need to know
more. (Aquinas had been recruited to Federico II’s new university in Naples where,
under the patronage of this Holy Roman Emperor, the Arabic commentaries were
curated.) As Islamic science progressed there was demand for more and more accurate
translations, which is why when the Royal Society of Scinces in Göttingen called in
1930 ‘for a collection of references to Syriac, Arabic, Armenian and Persian translations
of Greek authors’ (Gutas, xiii), the Leipzig edition of Galen alone, published 1821–30,
ran to 20 large volumes, while the Berlin Reimer edition of Aristotle Commentaries
(1882-1909) ran to many volumes. The translation movement ended when scholars
began writing ‘explicitly critical books with titles like Rhazes’ “Doubts about Galen”,
Ibn al-Haytam’s “Doubts about Ptolemy”… [and] Avicenna’s Eastern Philosophy …
which, for all practical purposes, could have been called “Doubts about Aristotle”’,36 indi-
cating that they believed Islamic science had already outstripped Greek. Meanwhile the
Caliphate had moved to Cordoba, and a new translation machine was set up in Toledo,
this time to translate the Arabic translations and commentaries into Latin. And then
the circle was indeed squared and Greek science was recirculated back to Western Europe!
Those works of Aristotle’s Organon, which had been translated and retranslated,
commented and recommented upon most, were his logical works comprising: the Cat-
egories, On Interpretation, the Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, Topics, On Sophis-
tical Refutations, and the Rhetoric; works that did not reach Western Europe until the
twelfth century, but on the basis of which, by the ninth century, Islamic dialectic,
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Jadal, was already well established. Not coincidentally, they were texts, as already noted,
essential to the development of Islamic jurisprudence, and the science of forensics, on
how to build and defend a case. As George Makdisi, in one of his foundational essays
on Islamic jurisprudence and the development of medieval dialectic, has noted, Islam,
which was not a church, and in the absence of councils or synods, depended on consen-
sus, ijma, to define orthodoxy, which was handed over to the jurists. ‘Since there was no
formal organization of ijma, the process worked retroactively’, each successive
generation
cast[ing] its glance backward to the generations that preceded it to see whether or not a
certain doctrine had gained acceptance through consensus; and this was decided by the
absence of a dissenting voice among the doctors of the law.37
‘Differences of opinion were compiled in large tomes, and khilaf, became an important
field of knowledge taught in the schools of law’. As Makdisi notes, by the tenth century
disputatio was already taught, and in the eleventh, these elements were brought together
in the works of the jurisconsult Ibn ‘Aquil (Baghdad, 1040 to 1119), whose ‘shorter dia-
lectic’ exhibits ‘the scholastic method itself in full bloom’, and whose longer work on dia-
lectic was especially written for lawyers (Makdisi, 650–51).The structure of scholastic
disputation is distinctive, and exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, educated at Naples in
the Arabic commentaries: ‘the Summa… is divided into Parts (pars), each Part is
divided into Questions (quaestio) and each Question into Articles, the article (articulus)
being stated in interrogative form’ (Makdisi 651). Ibn ‘Aquil, who like Aquinas was a pro-
fessor, concluded his three volume Summa with his declaration of intent:
In writing this work I followed a method whereby first I presented in logical order the theses,
then the arguments, then the objections, then the replies to the objections, then the pseudo-
arguments (of the opponents for the counter-theses), then the replies (in rebuttal of these
pseudo-arguments) – (all of this) for the purposes of teaching beginners the method of
disputation.
Makdisi notes the special circumstances of Ibn ‘Aquil, from a Baghdadi Hanafite family
(the most traditionalist of Islam’s legal schools), who nevertheless ‘grew up with rationalist
Mu’tazilism as part of his familiar surroundings’, and tried to reconcile them (Makdisi,
656–7). Of the sic-et-non method of disputation which Ibn ‘Aquil exemplifies, Makdisi
notes:
The sic-et-non method, dialectic and disputation are not the only elements that are found in
Islam before their appearance in the West. Noteworthy are the following parallel elements:
the Latin relationes or reportationes and the Islamic ta’liqa, notes of professorial lectures
that developed into the textbooks of the day, several of which have survived; the Latin
pecia, or piece of a book, and the Islamic juz’, is also a constituent part of a book, both of
which served the needs for reproducing the work before the advent of printing; the European
college, like the Collège des Dix-Huit in Paris, and the Muslim khan, in Baghdad, both of
which served as boarding houses for students, and where instruction later took place, the
Muslim khan becoming incorporated into the madrasa, and the European college becoming
a university.38
These Islamic institutions were not lacking channels by which to travel from East to West
via Byzantium, Italy, Sicily and Spain, and in his enquiry into the origins of the English
Inns of Court, and the corporate structure of colleges, Makdisi also notes the role of
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returning crusaders, who had observed Muslim practices and institutions in Jerusalem.
Law, like most Islamic learning, typically took place in the Mosque, which began life as
the city square or Agora but, as Oleg Grabar, the great historian of Islamic architecture
tells us, under pressure of competition from the Jewish synagogue and the Christian
church, gradually became transformed from an outdoor space, to an indoor space,
hence the columns, which were relics of the colonnaded shop fronts, and the fountain,
that would have been a feature of the city square.39 Mosques, as community centres
(the name Jamia, mosque, means community centre), usually had a khan or inn attached,
and Makdisi records one particularly generous philanthropist founding 3000 mosque-inn
complexes over a 30-year period.40 The mosque-inn complex was typically to be found in
cities which had no madrasas, for the madrasa was a further development in which
mosque and inn were combined in a single foundation; but there were nomadrasas in Jer-
usalem, or Palestine in general, Spain or Sicily.
Just as there were mosque-inn complexes in the East, so in the West we find, particu-
larly in the period relevant to the Crusades, the development of church-inns, and later Inns
of Court. In London, under King Stephen (1135–54) and his successor, Henry II (1154–
89), before the founding of the three earliest Oxford Colleges, University College, Balliol
and Merton, in the thirteenth century, there were three famous schools attached to
churches, that were used for teaching law: one attached to St. Paul’s in Paternoster
Row; St: George’s Inn attached to St. Sepulchre’s; and Thavies’ Inn attached to St. Andrews.
Makdisi records William Fitzstephen (d. 1190) churchman and lawyer, recounting of
the masters of law, who met ‘in the church with their “scholars” [the medieval English term
for undergraduates] and where they held disputations… . The principal meeting place of the
lawyers with their clients was in the parvis or porch, in some instances extending into the
aisle of the church, to which their hostel was attached… .’.41
These original church-inns were secularized by the end of the thirteenth century by a
series of ordinances and prohibitions by kings and popes, eventually becoming Inns of
Chancery, while independent Inns of Court were later established by apprentices-at-
law, which became the Inns of Court. The Inns of Chancery have ceased to exist, but
the history of the four surviving Inns of Court is, according to ancient sources, intimately
connected to the history of the Knights Templars and the Knights Hospitallers, founded in
Jerusalem during the Crusades. Makdisi (14–15) speculates that observation of the simi-
larity between Islamic law and English Common Law, as forms of customary law distinct
from Roman civil law and canon law, might have impressed the Crusaders. There was
indeed a precedent in the case of the returning Crusader, Jocius de Londoniis (John of
London), credited with the foundation of the first law-inn in Paris for 18 poor students
in 1180, hence its name the Collège des Dix-Huit. Makdisi (16–17) has much evidence
to back his claim that:
The scholastic method of disputation was developed by the Islamic legal profession in the
ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, and later taught in its law schools, then in Bologna as
of the twelfth century, was also the method used in the Inns of Court of England. Both
systems used the two methods of teaching developed in early Islam and later used in
Bologna, Paris, Oxford and elsewhere; namely the lecture and the disputation, which in
the Inns of Court were called ‘readings’ and ‘moots’.
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There is important legal-institutional continuity, as well. The charitable trust, or waqf,
which was and remains the enduring legal form of Islamic endowments, has its parallel
in the so-called Roman-law ‘corporation’ of the West, which might well have owed its
origins to imitation of the Islamic charitable foundation or waqf, known in Europe as
mortmain. Lodgings for students in the early universities of both Paris and Oxford took
the form of hospitia, but it was only at the point at which they became ‘incorporated’
that they became Colleges in the Roman and civil law senses of collegia. The incorporation
of Merton College, Oxford, in 1274, was a watershed in the development of the modern
college system, followed by the other colleges at Oxford, and Cambridge, who accepted
the Regula Mertonensis as embodying the ideal of ‘corporate’ collegiate structure.42 The
model for the Roman-law corporation was always held to be religious, as deriving from
the privileged legal status attributed to the religious sodalities of ancient Rome. But the
Roman evidence is thin, and it is only with the medieval monastic orders and colleges
of learning that we begin to see its appearance. A formidable body of evidence suggests
that the legal immunities afforded to the corporation were more likely to have been
copied from Islamic institutions, with which they shared other affinities.43 The Francis-
cans were the first to adopt the corporate immunity of a charitable foundation. Permitted
as a religious order to develop an institutional footprint that included property and chat-
tels, the order had a ‘legal personality’, but as individuals they were bound by the poverty
of Christ. Gaudiosi notes that ‘while Western legal scholars dispute the origin of the trust
in England, whether Roman or Germanic, it is well established that the institution “devel-
oped from a medieval English device for holding land known as the use”’; and indeed that,
‘until the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1535, trusts were commonly referred to as
uses’.44 The Franciscans are generally credited with the introduction of uses in thir-
teenth-century England, and the order was active in the Middle East, where Saint
Francis himself spent time in 1219 and 1220.
European jurisprudence turns on the so-called Roman Law ‘corporation’ in a many
fields, including theory of sovereignty, of financial corporations, and of insolvency. It
would indeed be ironic if its provenance were misplaced, and the model of the charitable
trust was rather the Islamic waqf than the Roman sodality, as looks highly likely. But once
again, corporation theory in the modern juristic sense was largely developed as part of the
revival of Roman Law in German universities that accompanied the rise of the historical
schools of Mommsen, and those scholars who theorized the German Reich under Bis-
marck, Savigny being foremost among them. Otto Friedrich von Gierke, (1841–1921),
the leading exponent of corporation theory in Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht,
(1868–1913, 4 vols: ‘The German Law of Associations’), was a Prussian legal philosopher
also teaching at the University of Berlin at the time of the debates around the new German
legal code, and a leader of the Germanist school of historical jurisprudence in opposition
to Savigny and the Romanist theoreticians of German law. He was highly critical of the
first draft (1888) of the civil law code as burdened with Roman law elements at the
expense of Germanic law. Von Gierke’s position on German vernacular law was developed
in his Deutsches Privatrecht, (1895–1917, 3 vols), based on his vision of an ideal state that
was a synthesis of Genossenschaften (cooperative associations) and Herrschaften (groups
subordinated to an individual imperious will), which he believed the Reich under
Bismark achieved. His pupil Hugo Preuss was chief draftsman of the German (Weimar
Republic) Constitution of 1919, but by now ‘Gierke, who had grown more authoritarian,
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attacked the document for its decentralizing tendency’. Gierke’s early emphasis on volun-
tary associations, rather than his later emphasis on unity, had considerable effect on plur-
alist theory, especially in Great Britain, where the English jurist Frederic William
Maitland’s Political Theories of the Middle Age (1900) was a partial translation of
Gierke’s Genossenschaftsrecht. This brings the history of Roman constitutionalism
beyond the Revolutions of the eighteenth century and up to the struggle for Empire of
the nineteenth.
5. Antiquity transformation and reformation
What has all this to do with Straumann’s Constitutionalism, one may well ask. In the first
place, to acknowledge the continuity of Ciceronian constitutionalism as an idiom founded
on the continuity of the humanist educational curriculum, does not rule out questioning
the role of Roman Law in the aetiology of legal institutions. To the extent that we are
talking about Roman Law at all, it has already gone through a series of reformations
and transmogrifications, beginning with Justinian’s codifications and continuing with
reformation of the Church under Hildebrand, Pope Gregory VII, whose policy of centra-
lization and legal codifications made the Papacy the template for fledgling European
nation states to imitate; followed, in turn by the codification of canon law under a
series of lawyer-Popes from influential Italian merchant families competing with the
Arabs for the Mediterranean trade, of whom Innocent III is the most representative.45
This unfolding process, brilliantly described in Harold Berman’s Law and Revolution,46
sees a watershed with the Protestant Reformation,47 but it does not stop. Early Protestant-
ism is generally credited with a hostility to Roman Law, seen mostly through the lens of
canon law, while the Gallican church and the monarchomachs in France, pulled off the
impossible, which was to stand it on its head by locating the great universitas, not in
the Church or the sovereign, but in the people as a corporation. But Roman Law, for
too long associated with the papacy, as ‘the ghost of the deceased Roman empire sitting
crowned upon the grave thereof’,48 came roaring back with the attempt to consolidate a
fragmented sovereignty under the Holy Roman Empire of the German Peoples in a
unified German Reich, in the period leading up to German Unification in 1870, and con-
tinuing into Weimar. We owe the revival of the classics and much of the methodology and
ingenuity of the modern social sciences to this impetus, still reflected in the curricula of
European universities.
In Britain and France, the revival of Rome and Roman Law was also implicated in
imperial projects, beginning earlier with Montesquieu’s Considérations sur les causes de
la grandeur des Romains et de leur decadence (1734) and Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire (1776). For proof of the role of the classics in British elite education
producing captains of empire, we have colonial Romanists like Syme and Badian,
whose genius was to outdo the colonial mother in articulating the ramifications of the
Great Game; the revival of Rome being the form that its legitimation and consolidation
took. The Great Game goes on and is reaching its tragic denouément in the Middle
East, where it has succeeded by persistent iconoclasm in wiping out the claims of the
Arabic translation movement and centuries of commentary to have curated the founda-
tional Greek texts of Western civilization, along with the role of Islamic jurisprudence
in the formation of Western law. The greatest injury in this long sequence of iconoclastic
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acts is to have destroyed all textual evidence, housed until the twenty-first century in
libraries and museums of Baghdad, Aleppo and Damascus, but now looted or reduced
to rubble in post-colonial wars, so that it is for the most part only through the archives
of the West, and particularly Berlin, that these histories could be reconstructed. There
is thus no simple story to be told of the history of Crisis and Constitutionalism, or even
of Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution. Nor
is any version of it innocent, or immune from the interrogation, ‘Cui bono?’49 History
is indeed no more than stories, but stories burdened with intent. And Straumann has
chosen as his subject one of the most successful and pervasive of them. But I wonder
for how long?
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